This paper analyzes the interaction between corporate taxes and corporate governance. We show that the characteristics of a taxation system affect the extraction of private benefits by company insiders. A higher tax rate increases the amount of income insiders divert, while stronger tax enforcement reduces it and, in so doing, can raise the stock market value of a company in spite of the increase in the tax burden. We also show that the corporate governance system affects the level of tax revenues and the sensitivity of tax revenues to tax changes. When the corporate governance system is ineffective (i.e., when it is easy to divert income), an increase in the tax rate can reduce tax revenues. We test this prediction in a panel of countries. Consistent with the model, we find that corporate tax rate increases have smaller (in fact, negative) effects on revenues when corporate governance is weaker.
Introduction
The state, thanks to its tax claim on cash flows, is de facto the largest minority shareholder in almost all corporations. Yet, the state's actions are not part of the standard analysis of corporate governance, which has typically emphasized legal protections for outside investors (as in La Porta et al (1998) and Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) ), the role of boards (e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) ), and the presence of large shareholders (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) ). 1 At the same time, the public finance literature on taxation typically ignores any effects of governance on the functioning of the corporate tax system (see Auerbach (2002) , Hubbard (1999), and Slemrod (2004) ).
In this paper, we provide a simple reason for why the analysis of corporate governance and taxation should be integrated. Most transactions aimed at diverting corporate value toward controlling shareholders also reduce the corporate tax liability. Vice versa, many procedures aimed at ascertaining and enforcing a corporate tax liability makes it more difficult for controlling shareholders to divert corporate value to their own advantage.
More generally, the determination of governance and tax outcomes arises from a game that involves three parties -the state, the insiders, and the outside shareholders. Our claim is simply that each bilateral interaction has important spillover effects on the third party: the way the State designs and enforces taxes impacts the relation between insiders and outside shareholders, while the terms of the relation between insiders and outside shareholders (corporate governance) influences the working of the corporate taxation system.
In a model that adopts this simple framework we analyze how the corporate tax system affects the level of managerial diversion. We show that a higher tax rate increases the level of diversion, while stronger tax enforcement reduces it. Not surprisingly, a higher tax rate increases the return to stealing. By contrast, increased levels of tax enforcement reduce the amount of private benefits. Most interestingly, an increase in the extent of tax enforcement increases the amount outside shareholders will receive (even accounting for the higher amount of taxes paid).
Hence, for a given tax rate, an increase in tax enforcement can increase (rather than decrease) the stock market value of a company.
Much as the structure of taxation affects corporate governance, the model introduced in the paper also demonstrates that corporate governance affects the working of the tax system.
When it is difficult to divert income, we derive the standard result of a relatively direct relation between tax rates and tax revenues. By contrast, when the corporate governance system is ineffective (i.e., when it is easy to divert income) an increase in the tax rate can reduce tax revenues, generating a hump-shaped relation between corporate tax rates and corporate tax revenues. This arises for the simple reason that when it is easy to divert income, the manager will behave as a residual claimant, accentuating his incentive to shelter income to avoid taxation.
As a result, the revenue maximizing tax rate is higher in countries with a better corporate governance system.
We then test the corporate governance and tax policy implications of our model. To test the corporate governance implications of taxes, we focus on Russia, an environment where both managerial diversion and tax evasion are manifest. We study the effect that an increase in tax enforcement (which followed Putin's election) had on stock prices and the value of control (a proxy for the amount of managerial diversion). As predicted by our model, the stock market values of companies targeted by enforcement actions increase and the voting premium for these stocks decrease after the increase in tax enforcement. We also document that increased tax enforcement leads to substantial organizational changes in the targeted companies, changes that make managerial diversion more difficult.
We then test the corporate tax implications of our model by using a panel of countries that vary with respect to their corporate governance rules. In particular, we test the hump-shaped relation between corporate tax rates and corporate tax revenues by investigating the revenue consequences of corporate tax rate changes from [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] . Consistent with the model, we find that corporate tax rate increases have a lower impact on tax revenues in countries characterized by weaker corporate governance. In particular, the empirical estimates suggest that corporate tax rate increases lead to corporate tax revenue increases only in countries with very strong corporate governance. As protection of outside shareholders weakens, these tax revenue increases are offset and ultimately outweighed by increased evasion. The inclusion of other control variables associated with the institutional environment -such as rule of law and measures of tax compliance -does not alter this result.
These results that follow from what we term a corporate governance view of taxes have important implications for the design of tax systems. They suggest that the fiscal effects of any corporate tax reform cannot be assessed without looking at the pre-existing corporate governance situation. They also suggest a clear direction for reforms in emerging markets. An increase in tax enforcement can provide payoffs to both governments and outside shareholders, as it generates greater revenue and higher outside share values.
Our paper explores only one dimension of the interaction between corporate governance and taxation. Arlen and Weiss (1995) emphasize the impact of taxes on the agency problem between managers and shareholders -taxes favor retention exacerbating the problem. Roe (1991) claims that in the United States taxes penalize ownership structures that facilitate monitoring.
Finally, Morck (2003) focuses on the effect double taxation of dividends has on ownership concentration (in particular stock pyramiding).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a model of the relationship between the tax system and corporate governance that generates several predictions on how corporate taxation affects corporate governance and how corporate governance affects corporate taxation. Section 3 extends the model and considers the optimal level of taxation. Section 4 tests the corporate governance implications of tax enforcement changes using recent changes in Russia, while Section 5 tests the effects of corporate governance on the impact of corporate tax changes in a panel of countries. Section 6 concludes.
A Simple Model of Tax Evasion and Managerial Diversion

2.1.
The optimal level of diversion
be the proportion of income that insiders divert. If insiders own a fraction λ of the company, then in the absence of any corporate income tax their payoff is
Diverting, however, is potentially costly, because insiders can be caught and pay a penalty. We model this cost with the following quadratic function:
where γ is a parameter that captures the quality of the corporate governance system. Hence, in the absence of taxes, the optimal amount of diversion is
The effect of a corporate income tax
We will now analyze how the presence of a third player, the government, affects the level of diversion. We characterize the tax system through two parameters, the tax rate and the level of enforcement of its tax claim. The tax system affects the choice of the optimal level of diversion in two ways: first, the presence of tax rates makes diversion more likely, as it increases the costs of not diverting income (if the income is left with the company the owner will not receive his per share benefit, but a lower amount as a result of taxes). Second, both the government and minority shareholders share an interest in detecting diversion. Hence, the corporate tax introduces an additional monitor (the tax authority), which increases the probability diversion will be detected and hence increases the expected cost of diversion.
We model this cost in an analogous way to the cost associated with shareholder oversight with the parameter in this case being α . Thus,in the presence of corporate taxation, insiders' total payoff becomes
Hence, the optimal amount of diversion is
From which we arrive at the following result:
Result 1: The introduction of a corporate tax improves corporate governance (i.e., reduces the amount of diversion) if and only if the level of tax enforcement exceeds a critical level defined as follows
Proof: By comparing (2) with (1).
As we said, the effect of the introduction of a corporate tax system on diversion is twofold.
The fact that the government takes a cut of the profits, increases the incentives to divert, while the additional monitoring reduces it. The overall effect depends on the relative strength of the two forces.
Corollary 1: For a given monitoring ability of the tax authorities (α ), the introduction of a corporate tax is more likely to reduce diversion (and improve corporate governance) when i)
The corporate governance system is weaker (lower γ );
ii) Ownership is less concentrated (lower λ );
iii) The tax rate is lower.
While obvious, this Corollary has important policy implications. Countries with a poor record of tax enforcement cannot introduce very steep corporate tax rates or otherwise they will see a worsening of the amount of diversion, with the well-know effect on the functioning of capital markets (e.g., La Porta et al, (1997) and Dyck and Zingales (2004) ).
The effect of the tax system on the value of outside shares and on the value of control
Having computed how the different characteristics of the tax system affect the optimal amount of dilution, we can easily compute how it affects the market value of a company.
Result 2:
The market value of a company increases with tax enforcement and decreases with the tax rate.
Proof: The market value is driven by the value minority shareholders can capture, which in turn is given by (1 )(1 )
An increase in the tax rate has two negative effects on minority shareholders. The direct effect is that the state takes a bigger cut, reducing the value left to minority shareholders.
The indirect effect is that a higher tax rate induces more diversion, reducing the value of minority shareholders. Since both effects goes in the same direction, the result is unambiguous. The second result could be more ambiguous: higher tax enforcement leads to more taxes paid but also less diversion. Which effect dominates? In the model presented here the effect is unambiguously positive, because the state gets only a fraction of the income, while insiders, when they divert, they get 100%. 2 More generally, the result holds as long as on the margin the fraction of pretax income appropriated by the state is less than the fraction appropriated by insiders.
For our empirical analysis, it is also useful to introduce the following two corollaries:
Corollary 2: Following an increase in enforcement, companies that were diverting proportionally more before will experience a larger increase in price.
Proof:
2 Another way to view this problem, which we used in a previous version, is to consider separately a sheltering decision and diversion decision, with income sheltered from the tax authorities split between controlling and non-controlling shareholders. This modification leads to similar results so long as the fraction of income diverted by insiders exceeds the tax rate. Our results on company value impact of tax reforms differs when the diversion of returns by the tax authorities exceeds that by the controlling shareholder out of sheltered income.
Following Dyck and Zingales (2004) , let us define the control premium (CP) as the difference between the per share payoff controlling shareholders receive and that outside shareholders receive, normalized by the total value of the company computed at the price of noncontrolling shares:
Accordingly, we have
Corollary 3: The value of control decreases with tax enforcement.
Proof:
. By using the envelope theorem
, the result follows.
Since tax enforcement reduces the amount of income diverted, this reduces the value of control and increase the value of minority shareholders. Hence, the control premium should decline. , which reaches an interior optimum for
The effect of the tax system on tax revenues
The intuition is very simple. An increase in corporate tax rates increases the amount of diversion, which in turn reduces taxable income and, thus the net effect can even be a decline in tax revenues. What drives the intensity of this behavioral response are: the size of the expected cost of diversion (α γ + ) and the extent of ownership concentration ( λ ), which makes insiders internalize more the cost of what they divert. If the expected cost of diversion or the level of insiders' ownership are not sufficiently high, then the behavioral response to increases in the tax rates is so strong that taxes will not be able to raise any revenue.
The most interesting aspect of the corporate governance view of taxes, however, is not the existence of a range where corporate tax revenues decline with tax rate increases per se, but the link between the shape of this relationship and two keys indicators of the a corporate governance system: the quality of the corporate governance system γ and the level of ownership concentration λ .
Corollary 4:
The sensitivity of tax revenues to tax rate changes increases with the quality of the corporate governance systemγ .
Proof:
Corollary 4 simply states that better corporate governance increases the sensitivity of tax revenues to tax changes. In fact, better corporate governance reduces not only the equilibrium amount of diversion, but also the sensitivity of diversion to changes in the tax rate. If the behavioral response to tax changes is more limited, then ceteris paribus an increase in tax rates will lead to a higher increase in revenues.
A similar effect holds for ownership concentration.
Corollary 5: The sensitivity of tax revenues to tax rate changes increases with ownership for tax rates below 50%. For tax rates above that, it decreases with ownership.
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Extensions and Robustness
The optimal tax rate
What is the optimal tax rate? Obviously, the answer depends upon the government's objective function. In general, we can assume that the government cares about revenues and also about diversion. While in our model diversion has no efficiency costs because it is mere redistribution from the shareholders to insiders, there are at least two reasons why the government may want to limit it. First, as shown both theoretically (e.g., Zingales 1995a) and empirically (Dyck and Zingales, 2004) higher diversion hampers the ability to raise external funds and, thus, the development of the equity market. A government that cares about that will want to put some negative weight on diversion. Second, in reality many of the tactics used to divert generate large deadweight costs.
Hence, it is reasonable to assume that a the government's objective function should be of the form
where ψ is the relative weight attributed to the goal of reducing dilution versus that of rasing revenues.
Result 4 Proof: Differentiating this with respect to t we obtain the optimal tax rate. From this the comparative statics with respect to the various parameters follows straightforwardly.
The message contained in Result 4 is important. In determining their tax rates countries should pay attention to their corporate governance situation and even to the prevailing level of insiders' ownership.
3.2 The optimal tax rate when insiders dominate the state These normative predictions seem to be inconsistent with the existing evidence. La Porta et al (1999) find that countries with a civil law system (which have poor protection for outside investors and high ownership concentration) also tend to have higher marginal tax rates and poor tax enforcement.
This result is not necessarily a rejection of the model. It could simply be a consequence of the fact that Governments are not run by benevolent dictators that maximize social welfare.
Their actions are more heavily driven by political goals or shaped by influential constituencies.
To explore the setting of the optimal tax rate when -as it is likely-corporate insiders have a disproportionate power in setting the political agenda, we assume that they will set t to maximize the value of their stake subject to satisfying a revenue constraint. Formally, they will maximize ** ** **2
(1 )(1 )
with respect to t, subject to a minimum tax revenue constraint:
Since the corporate insiders objective function is decreasing in t and convex, it will be maximized at the minimum level of t that satisfies the tax revenue constraint. Hence, we can obtain the relation between optimal tax rates and corporate governance by using the implicit function theorem on the budget constraint. Hence, we have
, then the optimal tax rate is decreasing in the level of corporate governance.
, which is negative if the denominator is negative.
This condition is satisfied for 1 2 t α γ λ λ
Thus, if the corporate tax rate is not too high, when corporate insiders drive the fiscal policy we should observe higher tax rates in countries with poorer corporate governance, as we do observe in practice.
The optimal tax rate when enforcement is endogenous
Thus far we have only considered one dimension of the tax system, i.e. the tax rate, assuming that the other dimension (the monitoring provided by the tax authorities) is exogenous.
While is it reasonable to assume that there is a component of this monitoring that is independent from the rest of the tax system and depends only on the efficiency of the bureaucratic system in that country, it is unreasonable to assume that the level of the tax rate has no impact on the quality of the monitoring.
In fact, in countries where corruption is limited a higher tax rate will generate stronger incentives (both at the political level and inside the government agency enforcing taxes) to enforce taxes more. By contrast, in a country where corruption is widespread, higher tax rates increases the probability that companies will pay off the tax enforcer, reducing the quality of enforcement.
To analyze these two cases, let's assume that tax enforcement is a function of the tax rate, e.g., 
It follows that
Result 6: The optimal tax rate increases in the quality of the corporate governance system.
Proof:
Assuming an interior solution the optimal tax rate is
Differentiating it with respect toγ we have
regardless of whether δ is positive or negative.
Thus, the effect of corporate governance found in Result 4 is robust to endogenizing the additional monitoring provided by the tax rate, as long as we maintain the benevolent social planner perspective. Once we drop it, the result is not so clear cut.
Robustness and Limitations of the Model
The interaction between corporate governance and taxes can be seen as a game among three parties -the state, the insiders, and the outside shareholders. In this game, every bilateral interaction has a spillover on the third party. Our model analyzes two spillovers: the way the State designs and enforces taxes impacts the relation between insiders and outsiders and the terms of the relation between insiders and outsiders (corporate governance) impact the working of the corporate taxation system. But of course, we know from Coase (1960) that in the absence of transaction costs any externality will be perfectly internalized and so whatever action is taken by the government will not have any effect on outside shareholders and vice versa. In reality, however, transaction costs do exist. Most importantly, there is a coordination cost for outside shareholders, which impairs their actions. In the model we have implicitly assumed this cost to be infinite and, thus, outside shareholders are completely at the mercy of insiders. This is clearly an extreme: outsiders may have some ability to restrain insiders. Introducing this possibility, however, does not change substantially the model. In fact, the power of outside shareholders can be subsumed in a company-specific γ . Where outsiders have more power, γ will be higher, and insiders will divert less. All the rest remains unchanged.
The same coordination cost prevents insiders and outside shareholders from coordinating to evade taxes. In fact, this is the main difference between publicly traded companies and privately held ones. In privately held companies shareholders often reach an agreement to minimize their collective tax liability through charging fictitious expenses. They, then, redistribute their tax savings among themselves with side contracts. This is not possible when there outside disperse shareholders.
Where collusion can take place is between the state and the insiders. The State, for instance, can demand higher payments from insiders (under the form of bribes) in exchange for closing an eye on the money they divert from outside shareholders. While this might seem a remote possibility in the United States, it is not unconceivable in countries like Russia. Such a strategy, however, encounters two problems. First, nothing guarantees that after paying its bribe a company is not subject to additional requests for bribes. The advantage of taxes is that the State can commit not to harass a company twice. Second, the State faces an agency problem in its collection of taxes. If it accepts bribes instead of official tax payments, it finds it difficult to limit the skimming of the proceeds done by its delegated agents. Hence, collusion between the State and insiders at the expenses of outsiders has its own disadvantages.
Finally, taxation is not the only interaction between the State and insiders that affect outside shareholders. The threat of nationalization (or renationalization, as in the Russian case)
has similar effects. The higher is the threat of nationalization, the higher is the expected tax rate, and the more insiders are tempted to dilute. This factor contributes to explain the egregious examples of diversion that occurred in Russia during the Yeltsin presidency.
Corporate Governance Implications
Looking jointly at taxation and corporate governance, an approach we shall call corporate governance view of taxes, carries implications both for corporate governance and for corporate taxation.
Testing the corporate governance implications is more difficult. The prediction that is easiest to test (i.e., that an increase in tax rates reduces stock prices) is not unique to this approach: the same implication also follows from a traditional view of taxes. By contrast, the predictions that are unique to this approach (the effect of enforcement on stock prices and control premia) require us to measure variables that are difficult to quantify (tax enforcement) or even to observe in a systematic way (control premia). Dyck and Zingales (2004) exploit cross-country variation in tax enforcement and control premia to show that --consistent with Corollary 3 --higher levels of tax enforcement lead to lower control premia, even controlling for national differences in legal protections for investors.
In this context, however, we want to provide more disaggregated, within country, evidence. For this reason, we focus on Russia, a country where both tax avoidance and managerial diversion are extreme. The substantive increase in tax enforcement following Putin's election in 2000, which occurred without an immediate change in tax rates, provides a natural experiment to test these predictions.
A Case Study
To understand how tax evasion and diversion can interact, we begin with a case study of an oil company in Russia. We choose Sibneft, the 5 th largest Russian integrated oil company, because it was one of the first companies to be indicted for tax evasion.
Under President Yeltsin, high tax rates and low levels of tax enforcement encouraged Russian firms to shelter income aggressively. Multiple taxes from different levels of government meant that tax obligations could even exceed profits. 3 Company executives were not shy about how this tax burden affected their behavior. As Yukos Oil CEO Khodorkovsky argued, "As long as the tax regime is unjust, I will try to find a way around it." 4 A popular scheme to evade taxes and dilute minority shareholders was to sell oil at below-market prices to outside trading companies. To get a sense of the magnitude of the manipulation in transfer pricing, analyst reports indicate that Sibneft's production subsidiary was selling oil at just $2.20/ barrel, considerably below the average export price (net of export costs and excise taxes) of $13.50, and the average domestic price (net of taxes) of $7.20/ barrel. space on government-owned pipelines (rather than allocating them at a price that covered costs).
On Although such returns cannot be interpreted as causal, since many other factors may be driving returns aside from changes in tax policy, they do suggest that tax changes have not impeded returns for minority investors. 11 We focus on these enforcement actions that appeared to be targeted on increasing government revenue rather than some other events that involved tax police that commentary at the time suggested was more politically than economically motivated. 
Cross industry test
Sibneft's experience is not unique. As Figure 1 shows, the increase in enforcement under
Putin is followed by an increase in stock prices, especially in the most affected industry (i.e., Oil and Gas). Yet, this evidence alone is unconvincing. So many changes were taking place in Russia at the same time, that it is hard to pinpoint a single cause. For this reason, we will rely on two subtler tests. First, we look at the difference in voting premia across industries. Since tax enforcement affected the oil and gas industry disproportionately, during this period control premia should drop more in the oil and gas industry than in the other industries. We can infer control premia from the difference in voting and nonvoting stock (see Zingales 1994 Zingales , 1995b .
This approach has the advantage to control for any variation in the fundamental value of these companies. Second, we look within the oil and gas industry and we test whether oil and gas companies that avoided taxes the most exhibited higher returns around the major enforcement dates -as predicted by Corollary 2.
The ideal method to measure the value of control relies on control block sales. 16 For a discussion of the different methods see Dyck and Zingales (2003) .
enforcement change to use this method. Alternatively, one can use the price differential between voting and nonvoting shares (i.e., the value of a vote). The value of a vote is related to the value of control through the probability a vote will be pivotal (see Zingales (1994 Zingales ( , 1995b ). If this probability, which is a function of the existing ownership structure, remains relatively constant over time, we can infer changes in the value of control from changes in the voting premia.
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To conduct this test, we collect a sample of all the companies in Russia having two classes of stocks with differential voting rights from the Datastream sample of Russian securities (124 firms). To obtain meaningful voting premia, we restrict our attention to companies having some trading in both classes in event windows prior to and following what we view to be the most important indicators of increased tax enforcement (59 firms). Table 2 shows a decline in voting premium during the period of increased tax enforcement, from 57 percent to 46 percent. The composition of the sample, however, changes. Thus, a more appropriate comparison, limited to companies that were traded both at the beginning and at the end of the sample period, is provided in Panel B, column 1. It shows a decline in the voting premium of 7.8 percentage points, which is significant at the 5 percent level.
Consistent with Corollary 3, Panel A of
Why did it decline? If, as we think, this decline is associated with increased tax enforcement, then it should be more pronounced in the companies that were targeted the most by this enforcement. Since the main focus of Putin's actions were the oil & gas industry and mineral extraction industry, we examine how much of this decline is concentrated in these industries. As column 2 of panel B shows, the entire decline is concentrated in these extractive industries.
There is no significant decline in other industries. The observed decline, thus, cannot be explained by a general improvement in the Russian corporate governance situation, which would have affected all companies similarly. Only something that differentially affected the two set of industries, such as tax enforcement, could have caused it.
17 Goetzman et al. (2002) claim that in Russia this voting premium is too high to be justifiable solely on the value of control. They attribute it more broadly to the risk that nonvoting stock could be discriminated against in future corporate transactions (a corporate governance discount). Even if we accept this interpretation, changes in the voting premium over short time periods are a pretty reliable indicator of changes in the degree majority shareholders take advantage of their position at the expense of outside ones.
Within-oil-industry comparisons
An increase in tax enforcement does not affect all oil and gas companies in the same way.
Specifically, if some companies were diverting more beforehand, then they should be more affected by the increased enforcement. In the oil industry, a common indicator of tax sheltering activity is revenue per barrel of oil. If Corollary 3 is correct, companies that were selling their oil at very low prices (i.e.,
were engaged in massive tax sheltering) should experience a greater price appreciation during this period of enhanced tax enforcement than companies that were selling their oil closer to market prices. We focus on a panel of four notable enforcement actions taken between July 2000 and January 2001, which affected the whole industry as discussed above. For announcement returns, we use excess returns (defined as the cumulative excess return) over a ten day window (t-1, to t+9) surrounding the announced enforcement action. In our excess return calculations, we use the RTS index (the Rouble index when security quoted in Roubles and the dollar index when the share price quoted in dollars). We regress these announcement returns on indicators of tax avoidance. As indicator of tax avoidance we use the average selling price per barrel of oil in 1999, a period prior to the stepped up enforcement actions.
As Table 3 shows we have two such measures: the average 1999 selling price and the average price during the month of August 1999. In the first column of Table 4 we use the first datum as an indicator of tax cheating. Unfortunately, the intersection between the companies for which we have the average 1999 selling price per barrel and the companies for which we have market prices reduces the sample to only 9 observations. Nevertheless, as column 1 of Table 4 shows, we find companies that were avoiding taxes the least (and hence had higher selling prices) had lower market returns around the announcement of higher tax enforcement, and the difference is significant at the 5 percent level. This evidence is in contradiction with the traditional view of taxes (companies that pay more taxes to begin with should be less affected by tax enforcement and hence should have higher returns), but is consistent with our corporate governance view.
To expand the sample, we pool together estimates of the selling price based on the entire year and estimates based on the month of August (first and second columns of Table 3 ). As column 2 of Table 4 shows, the previous results are confirmed in this larger sample. Not surprisingly, the magnitude of the coefficient has dropped, since this is a more noisy measure of tax avoidance due to monthly fluctuations of oil prices. Nevertheless, the average selling price has a negative and statistically significant effect on the stock market reaction to the announcements of greater tax enforcements.
These results, although limited by the underlying availability of data, are consistent with the corporate governance view of taxes. Private benefits of control, as measured using dual class voting shares, not only decline when tax enforcement increases, but they decline by a greater amount in extractive industries relative to other Russian industries. Similarly, oil companies that were more aggressive tax shelterers experience greater returns, when tax enforcement increases.
Corporate Tax Implications
The corporate governance view of taxes has also implications for the responsiveness of tax revenues to changes in the tax rate. To test these implications we search for a setting where changes in tax rates occurred in countries with both strong and weak corporate governance. and and where the behavior response to these changes takes places in setting with both strong and weak governance. A natural setting is a cross-country panel dataset.
The Data
We construct a panel data set that combines information on corporate tax revenues, top 19 The data on tax rates are available for a large cross section of countries only after 1979. Thus, our sample starts in 1979 and ends in 1997, the last year for which this information was available. From the original set of countries in our sample, we exclude the major oil-producing countries given the distinctive dynamics of corporate tax revenues in these settings.
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As a measure of corporate governance, we use the control premium in negotiated control block sales, as computed by Dyck and Zingales (2003) . Consistent with the spirit of our model, the Dyck and Zingales' measure capture the amount of private benefits extracted by insiders. To check whether the effects we find merely reflect other institutional weaknesses, we will use two additional measures of the quality of institutions: "rule of law" (an index from 0 to 10 that measures the strength of a country's law and order tradition as developed by International 18 This data is available at www.otpr.org. 19 Specifically, data on corporate tax revenues are provided as variable g8h1aa in the GFS database and total tax revenues as variable g8h1y in the GFS database. Several countries that have variables from the Dyck and Zingales (2003) and LLSV (1998) databases do not provide corporate tax revenues collection statistics further narrowing the relevant sample. These countries include Chile, Hong Kong, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Venezuela. For countries with data on tax rates but no data on corporate tax revenues we conducted additional data searches of country sources (including the finance ministry, tax authorities, IMF Article IV statistical appendices and other sources) and these searches produced additional data for Hong Kong and Taiwan. The electronic version of the GFS variables currently available are not yet updated past 1997. 20 The countries excluded are the major oil exporting countries defined as (a) OPEC members, (b) affiliated non-members Oman and Angola and (c) non-OPEC members in the list of the top 10 oil exporting countries. This last requirement, which excludes Norway, Mexico and Russia, actually only eliminates Norway, as corporate tax revenues for Mexico and Russia are not in our ownership or private benefit samples. In these oil-rich countries, corporate tax revenues are typically not income taxes and corporate tax revenues fluctuate with the world price of oil conflating the analysis.
Country Risk, a country risk rating agency) and tax compliance (an index from 0 to 6 developed by the World Competitiveness Report, which assesses the level of tax compliance). collapsed by country. In addition to the raw data, we also report country-specific curve slopes.
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As described below, these slopes have been obtained by regressing the logarithm of corporate tax revenues on the logarithm of the GDP and the level of the corporate tax rate.
The panel structure of the sample is useful because we can use the within-country variability over time to estimate the slope of the relation between corporate tax revenues and corporate tax rates and the cross-country variation to identify how corporate governance influence the slope of this relation. Since the slope of the curve is estimated using withincountry variation, it is important to have a sense of the magnitude and the direction of these variations. Figure 2 plots the changes in corporate tax rates in the countries in the OTPR dataset during our sample period. In this period, most of the changes, but not all, are tax rate reductions.
Furthermore, most, if not all, of these reductions have been accompanied by a broadening of the tax base. Unfortunately, in the regressions we will be unable to control for base broadening.
Thus, our sample is biased toward finding a negative-sloped curve.
Our interest, however, is not on the average slope of this curve, but on how this slope changes with the quality of the corporate governance system. Since the coupling of base broadening and tax rate reductions appears to be widespread and not unique to countries with high ownership concentration or large private benefits, our cross-countries results should not be affected by the inability to measure base broadening in a systematic way. (1998, 1999) . 22 For surveys of the nature of tax reform during this period, see Cummins, Hassett and Hubbard (1996) for the OECD and Thirsk (1997) for developing countries. There is no evidence, from such sources, that the likelihood of base broadenings being coupled with tax rate changes is correlated with income or ownerships concentration or corporate governance. In fact, from a political
Results
Our maintained assumption is that after controlling for the level of GDP, every country faces the same relation between corporate tax revenues and corporate tax rates, except for the differences coming from the ownership concentration and the corporate governance. Since the corporate sector represents a different share of the economy in each country, we allow for country-specific relationships between tax revenues and GDP. Our basic specification, then, is as follows:
Log Corporate Tax Revenues α β Log GDP ητ ε where i indexes countries, t is a time subscript and τ is the top marginal corporate tax rate. η provides the slope of the corporate tax revenues curve. Both tax revenues and GDP are measured in unit of local currency. Since we are estimating in logarithms, however, differences in the dimensionality are fully absorbed by the country fixed effects. The standard errors are adjusted for potential clustering of the residuals at the country level.
Column 1 of Table 6 reports estimates of this basic specification. On average a tax increase raises corporate tax revenues, but by a minimal amount: a 10 percentage point increase in the tax rates (from 15% to 25%, for example) increases corporate revenues by 1%. The average effect, however, is not statistically different from zero. As we warned, this average effect is likely to be downward biased, because in this period most of the changes have been tax reductions associated with base broadening.
Corollary 4, however, has specific predictions on how the shape of the corporate tax revenue curve will differ across countries: worse levels of corporate governance (higher levels ofγ ) reduce the revenue maximizing tax rate. We can test this prediction directly by using the Dyck and Zingales (2004) estimates of control premia in different countries as a measure of corporate governance. Since it is a measure of how much controlling shareholders appropriate for themselves, it is directly related toγ .
economy point of view, we believe the link is more likely to bias against finding results consistent with the corporate governance view of taxes. In countries with higher ownership concentration, owners should be more effective in lobbying against a base broadening that accompanies a tax rate reduction.
Column 1 of Table 6 presents the estimates of our basic specification, where we have inserted the interaction between corporate tax rates and the level of control premium. The standard errors are adjusted for potential clustering of the residuals at the country level. Since
Corollary 4 predicts a positive relation between the sensitivity of tax revenues to changes in the tax rate and quality of corporate governance, we expect the coefficient of the interaction between tax rates and corporate measure of private benefits to be negative (because higher private benefits are an indicator of worse corporate governance). As expected, the interaction term is negative and statistically significant, i.e., countries with worse corporate governance have a lower sensitivity of tax revenues to tax increases. The threshold level of the control premium for a revenue-neutral relationship between corporate tax rates and corporate tax revenues is 20%.
The coefficient of the interaction between corporate governance and tax rates might reflect other attributes of the institutional environment that would dictate the responsiveness of tax revenues to rate changes. In a country where there is no enforcement of taxes, for instance, changes in the tax rates might have very little effect on tax revenues, reducing the slope of the tax revenue curve. If countries with low tax enforcement are also countries with worse corporate governance, we might have a spurious effect. To exclude this possibility we insert in the regression an interaction between the tax rate and other measures of effectiveness of the institutional environment. In column 3 we use the law and order tradition of a country. Countries with a stronger law and order tradition have a more sloped curve, but this effect is not statistically significant. More importantly, the effect of corporate governance, while slightly reduced in magnitude remains statistically significant. Similarly, in column 3 we insert the interaction between the tax rate and our measure of tax compliance. Surprisingly, countries where tax compliance is higher have a less steep tax revenue curve, but once again this effect is not statistically significant. By contrast, our main effect is larger and remains highly statistically significant.
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We provide another way to illustrate how the relationship between tax rates and revenues differs depending on the governance environment in columns 4-7. In columns 4 and 5 we divide the sample on the basis of the median level of control premium and in columns 6-7 we divide the sample based on a control premia of 10%, which highlights the differences in countries with more extreme governance difficulties . As predicted by the model, in countries where the control premium is below the median the coefficient of the tax rate is positive, while in countries where the control premium is above the median, the coefficient of the tax rate is less and in fact negative. This effect is more pronounced the more severe are the governance difficulties, as seen in comparing column 5 and 7.
Obviously, changes in the corporate tax rate do not happen in a vacuum and it is conceivable that changes in tax rates are accompanied by changes in tax enforcement or by other changes in the fiscal structure, which might conflate these results. To try and address this problem we scale corporate tax revenues first by GDP and then by total tax revenues. We then repeat all the previous regressions using this dependent variable (columns 8 and 9 of Table 6 ).
The results are consistent with the results presented in column 1, as the interaction of tax rates and corporate governance carries a negative and statistically significant coefficient.
The predictions on the effects of ownership on the tax revenue sensitivity to tax rate changes are more nuanced (Corollary 5). The sign of the coefficient depends upon the level of the tax rate. Furthermore, at an aggregate level, ownership concentration is highly correlated with private benefits, so when we put them both in the regression (not reported) it is impossible to distinguish the effect of one from the effect of the other.
The preceding analysis constrains the tax revenue curve to be identical across all the countries (but for the effect of corporate governance). Now, we redo our analysis estimating country-specific slopes by employing the same specification country-by-country. Such a procedure, of course, comes at considerable cost since we estimate many more parameters with the same number of observations. Table 7 analyzes the relation between country-specific tax revenue slopes and governance levels weighting each observation by the precision of each estimate (the inverse of the variance of the estimated slope).
As predicted by the model the value of control premia is negatively related to the sensitivity of tax revenues to tax rates estimated using the logarithm of corporate tax revenues as a dependent variable (columns 1 and 2).
23 As another test we used the log gdp per capita and find identical results.
Conclusion
This paper provides a new way of looking at the role of corporate taxation. Unlike the traditional approach, we emphasize that the commonality of interest between tax authorities and outside shareholders: both have an interest in reducing managerial diversion. By using this approach, we show how the characteristics of the corporate taxation system affect corporate governance and the valuation of firms. We also show how the characteristics of the corporate governance system affect the responsiveness of tax revenues to changes in tax rates. Consistent with the model's predictions, we provide evidence that tax enforcement positively affects valuation and that the quality of corporate governance plays an important role in determining how tax rate changes translate into revenue changes.
Our analysis suggests that improving the corporate tax system -through simplification and increased enforcement -may well substantially improve overall corporate governance. This new approach to improving corporate governance is particularly appealing in light of the difficulties associated with the current alternative: a major overhaul of the legal system.
Our results also provide a rationale for the introduction of a corporate tax in the United
States in 1909. At that time, there were very few mechanisms to restraint managerial diversion.
Consistently, President Taft supported its introduction by saying: 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 THAILAND 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 TURKEY 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 UNITED KINGDOM 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 UNITED STATES 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 VENEZUELA 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 
Change in Voting Premia
Note. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ** indicates significant at 5 percent, * indicates significant at 10 percent Panel A reports the average level of control premia for the unbalanced sample prior to the period of increased enforcement and after the enforcement period (in both instances reporting the company average over a four month period to capture the largest number of securities).The sample includes all russian equities in Datastream with two classes of stock (124 companies) where there is movement in the price of both voting and non-voting shares within five days (59 companies). The voting premia, expressed as a percentage of the equity value of the company, is defined as the difference in price between the voting and non-voting shares multiplied by the number of voting shares divided by the total equity value of the company. Panel B reports a regression of the change in the voting premia on a constant and a dummy variable for firms in extractive industries (oil and minerals) that were the focus of enforcement actions. This regression restricts attention to the more liquid securities that had trading volume both prior and after enforcement, using the average of the immediate month preceding and following the enforcement action. Tables 6 to 8 . The top panel provides descriptive statistics for variables form the unbalanced panel while the bottom panel provides variables from the cross-section of country when the Laffer equations are run country-by-country. "Log Corporate Tax Revenues" is the natural log of corporate tax revenues as measured in local currency and as provided in the Government Finance Statistics (GFS) electronic database. "Corporate Tax Revenues/Total Tax Revenues" is the ratio of corporate tax revenues to total tax revenues as provided in GFS and as described in text. "Corporate Tax Revenues/GDP" is the ratio of corporate tax revenues to GDP as provided in GFS and IFS and as described in text. "Marginal Tax Rates" are the top corporate statutory rates as provided in the OTPR database and as described in the text. "Ownership Concentration" is the average percentage of common shares owned by the three largest shareholders in the 10 largest nonfinancial, privately owned domestic firms in a given country as computed by La Porta et al. (1998) . The "Measure of Private Benefits" is the control premium in negotiated control block sales, as computed by Dyck and Zingales (2003) . "Rule of Law" is a measure of the law and order tradition as reported in the International Country Risk Guide and reported in La Porta et al. (1998) . "Tax Evasion" is a measure of tax compliance reported in the Global Competitiveness Report for 1995 as reported in La Porta et al. (1999) . "Maximum Within-Country Difference in Marginal Tax Rates" is the maximum difference between tax rates for a given country during the panel. Note: The dependent variable in columns 1-5 is the log of corporate tax revenues. The dependent variable in column 6 is the ratio of corporate tax revenues to GDP. The dependent variable in co corporate tax revenues to total tax revenues. "Marginal Tax Rates" are the top corporate statutory rate as provided in the OTPR database and as described in the text. The "Marginal Tax Rate Inter of Private Benefits" is the product of the tax rate and the control premium in negotiated control block sales, as computed by Dyck and Zingales (2003) . The "Marginal Tax Rate Interacted with R product of the tax rate and a measure of the law and order tradition as reported in the International Country Risk Guide and reported in La Porta et al. (1998) . The "Marginal Tax Rate Interacted w the product of the tax rate and a measure of tax compliance reported in the Global Competitiveness Report for 1995 as reported in La Porta et al. (1999) . All specifications employ country fixed e interactions of those country fixed effects with log GDP. Columns 1, 2, 3, 6 and 7 employ the full sample and the remaining columns partition the sample into subsamples based on the measure o Note: The dependent variable in columns 1-2 is the country-specific sensitivity slope generated by regressing the log of corporate tax revenues on log GDP and the corporate statutory rates. The "Measure of Private Benefits" is control premium in negotiated control block sales, as computed by Dyck and Zingales (2003) . "Ownership Concentration" is the average percentage of common shares owned by the three largest shareholders in the 10 largest nonfinancial, privately owned domestic firms in a given country as computed by La Porta et al. (1998) . All specifications are weighted least squares regressions where observations are weighted by the inverse of the variance of the measured slopes from country-specific regressions.
